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to the majority, the duty imposed, namely the requisite degree of care necessary
to relieve the instant defendant from liability, would be fulfilled if the jury
found that the house had been secured upon its becoming vacant, that frequent
inspections had been made of the premises, and resecurement had been effected
when items amiss were ascertained. The fact that the house was actually in
violation of the statute at the time of the accident would, under such circum14
stances, have no bearing upon liability.
A careful reading of the Runkel decision, expressly stated in terms of
mandatory duty regardless of negligence, does not easily admit of the concepts
of reasonableness and degree of care. In the instant case, the Court has, in
effect, substantially modified if not overruled the Runkel decision. The statutory
provisions involved here, admittedly designed for individual and public safety,
are of the tenor which historically have imposed strict liability.' 5 Even assuming Runkel to admit of varying degrees of care, the previously noted policy
of the Court to exact a high degree of care where trespassing children are
involved, especially where the landowner is on notice that children are or will
likely be in close proximity to the dangerous instrumentality, 0 would seem to
warrant a recovery on the instant facts since the ten-year-old infant plaintiff
had been playing at a playground adjacent to the abandoned house. Further,
the distinction drawn by the majority between a building in imminent danger
of collapse and a building in a state of disrepair seems at best unrealistic both
in light of the statutory mandate and the facts. It stretches the imagination to
find substantial difference between a collapsing building and a collapsing ceiling
as injury-precipitating agents: one seems as inherently dangerous as the other.
In view of the availability of insurance protection to landowners, the nature of
the risks involved in maintaining dilapidated structures on one's property, and
the manifest intent of such socially desirable statutory enactments as are herein
involved, the position of the dissent seems highly preferable.
Thomas C. Mack
MALPRACTICE-CAUSE OF ACTION ACCRUES ONLY AT END OF TREATMENT
WHICH INCLUDES WRONGFUL ACTS OR OMISSIONS

Infant plaintiff on October 10, 1956, was taken to defendant city's hospital
for treatment of severe burns. Following initial treatment and dressing of
wounds the infant, by reason of the hospital personnel's negligence, suffered
permanent brain damage at the hosptital on the night he was admitted. In
addition to the first act of negligence, the child was the victim of neglect
amounting to malpractice on three later occasions, the last of which occurred
14.

Instant case at 408, 190 N.E.2d at 417, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 22.

15. See Weiner v. Leroco Realty Corp., 279 N.Y. 127, 17 N.E.2d 796 (1938).
16. See DiBiase v. Ewart & Lake, 228 App. Div. 407, 240 N.Y. Supp. 132 (4th Dep't
1930) aff'd, 255 N.Y. 620, 175 N.E. 339 (1931); Collentine v. City of New York, 279 N.Y.
119, 17 N.E.2d 792 (1938); Mayer v. Temple Properties, 307 N.Y. 559, 122 N.E.2d 909
(1954).
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on November 25, 1957. He remained in the hospital for physiotherapy and
rehabilitation until February 14, 1958, eighty-one days after the last act of
malpractice, and filed notice of claim with the city sixty-three days after his
release. The Supreme Court-Trial Term rendered judgment against the city,
and the Appellate Division' reversed solely on the ground that the notice of
claim against the city, a prerequisite to recovery, was not given within ninety
days after the claim accrued. 2 On appeal, held, reversed with two judges dissenting. When the course of treatment which includes the wrongful acts or
omissions runs continuously, and is related to the same original condition or
complaint, the accrual comes only at the end of treatment. Borgia v. City of
New York, 12 N.Y.2d 151, 187 N.E.2d 777, 237 N.Y.S.2d 319 (1962).
By definition, a statute of limitations prescribes limits to the right of action
on certain described causes of action, declaring that suits cannot be maintained
on such claims unless brought within a specified time period after the right
accrues. 3 Malpractice statutes of limitation "refers to actions to recover damages
for personal injuries resulting from the misconduct of physicians, surgeons and
others practicing a profession similar to those enumerated." 4 The legislative
intent in enacting such statutes was to protect prospective defendants from
untimely suits which would have deprived them of adequate investigatory opportunities, rather than to defeat the rights of plaintiffs with legitimate claims.5
Prior to September 1, 1963, the statute of limitations for malpractice against
physicians in New York was two years; 6 at that time it was extended to three
years.7 However, the malpractice limitation applicable to suits against municipalities is only ninety days.8 None of these provisions indicate whether the
limitation begins to run from the time the claimant learns of the injury, from
the time the malpractice occurs or from the time treatment ends. Whether the
court is passing on a true statute of limitations problem or a section 50-e dispute,
the issue which must be decided is the same; when did the claim or cause of
action accrue? 9 New York courts have held that the cause of action accrues
at the date the malpractice is perpetrated.' 0 Yet, as early as 1923, it was decided
that where a physician performing surgery fails to remove an implement from
claimant's body and does not remove it thereafter, though he continues to
1. Borgia v. City of New York, 16 A.D.2d 927, 229 N.Y.S.2d 318 (2d Dep't 1962).
2. N.Y. Munic. Law § 50-e.
3. Black, Law Dictionary 1077 (4th ed. 1951).
4. Federal Int'l Banking Co. v. Touche, 248 N.Y. 517, 518, 162 N.E. 507, 507 (1928).

See Lillich, The Malpractice Statute of Limitations in N.Y. and Other Jurisdictions, 47
Cornell L.Q. 339, 339 (1962).
5. In the Matter of Kramer v. Bd. of Educ., 2 Misc.2d 644, 150 N.Y.S.2d 489
(Schenectady County Co. 1956); Robinson v. Bd. of Educ. of Galway, 1 Misc.2d 634, 152
N.Y.S.2d 134 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
6. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1920, ch. 925, § 50(1).

7. N.Y. CPLR § 214(6).
8. N.Y. Munic. Law § 50-e.

9. Instant case at 155, 187 N.E.2d 777, 778, 237 N.Y.S.2d 319, 321 (1962).
10. Barnes v. Gardner, 170 Misc. 604, 9 N.Y.S.2d 785 (Sup. Ct. 1939); see Tulloch
v. Hasello, 218 App. Div. 313, 218 N.Y. Supp. 139 (3d Dep't 1926); see Frankel v.
Wolper, 181 App. Div. 485, 169 N.Y. Supp. 15 (2d Dep't 1918).
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treat her for more than two and one-half years, claimant's cause of action is not
barred by the statute although suit was brought more than two years after the
operation."- The court reasoned that since the tort was a continuing one, the
statute did not begin to run until the physician terminated his treatment.12
This theory dominates in New York 3 and also exists elsewhere. 14 Yet, further
refinement had to be made; at what point does treatment end?
Early decisions, although there was no accord upon this question, did not
allow the statute to toll while treatment for that injury which caused the plaintiff to consult the physician continued.' 5 Courts often could not determine
whether malpractice occurred in the initial treatment alone, during the aftercare or both.' 6 Therefore, it was held that the time limitation of the statute
should not accrue until the malpractice terminated, which could arise at the
end of one operation, or after a series of them, and it could even extend to the
end of postoperative care. 17 More recently a New York decision completely
ignored mentioning that the treatment subsequent to the initial injury must be
negligent in order to keep the statute from running, leading to the inference
that negligence during the continuous treatment may not even be necessary
to hold the statute.' 8 From decisions such as these the doctrine of continuous treatment in New York evolved; the statute will not begin to toll in
an action for malpractice until the date the postoperative care terminates, 10
or upon the date the doctor last treats the patient,20 or upon termination
of the physician-patient relationship. 21 In the decision now under examination, the court extended this doctrine stating that "at least when the course
of treatment which includes the wrongful acts or omissions has run continuously and is related to the same original condition or complaint, the
'accrual' comes only at the end of the treatment." 22 But the court limits its
11. Sly v. Van Lengen, 120 Misc. 420, 198 N.Y. Supp. 608 (Sup. Ct. 1923).
12. Id. at 422, 198 N.Y.Supp. at 610.
13. Hammer v. Rosen, 7 N.Y.2d 376, 165 N.E.2d 756, 198 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1960); see
Budoff v. Kessler, 284 App. Div. 1049, 135 N.Y.S.2d 717 (2d Dep't 1954) (memorandum
decision); see Figuerca v. City of New York, 106 N.Y.S.2d 430 (Sup. Ct. 1951), afl'd,
279 App. Div. 771, 109 N.Y.S.2d 126 (2d Dep't 1951); see Piedmont v. Society of N.Y.
Hospital, 25 Misc.2d 41, 204 N.Y.S.2d 592 (Sup. Ct. 1961); see Dorfman v. Schoenfeld,
26 Misc.2d 37, 203 N.Y.S.2d 955 (Sup. Ct. 1960); see Nervick v. Fine, 195 Misc. 464,
87 N.Y.S.2d 534 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
14. Williams v. Elias, 140 Neb. 656, 1 N.W.2d 121 (1941); accord, DeHaan v.
Winter, 258 Mich. 293, 241 N.W. 923 (1932); accord, Schmit v. Esser, 183 Minn. 354, 236
N.W. 622 (1931); accord, Schanil v. Branton, 181 Minn. 381, 232 N.W. 708 (1930).
15. DeHaan v. Winter, 258 Mich. 293, 241 N.W. 923 (1932); see Sly v. Van Lengen,
120 Misc. 420, 198 N.Y.Supp. 608 (Sup. Ct. 1923); see Conklin v. Draper, 229 App. Div.
227, 241 N.Y.Supp. 529 (1st Dep't 1930); but see Wetzel v. Pius, 78 Cal.App. 104, 248
Pac. 288 (3d Dist. Ct. App. 1926); contra, Cappucci v. Barone, 266 Mass. 578, 165 N.E.
653 (1929).

16. Nervick v. Fine, 195 Misc. 464, 465, 87 N.Y.S.2d 534, 535 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
17. Ibid.
18. See Hammer v. Rosen, 7 N.Y.2d 376, 165 N.E.2d 756, 198 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1960).
19. Dorfman v. Schoenfeld, 26 Misc. 2d 37, 203 N.Y.S.2d 955 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
20. Piedmont v. Society of N.Y. Hospital, 25 Misc. 2d 41, 204 N.Y.S.2d 592, (Sup.
Ct. 1961).
21. Budoff v. Kessler, 284 App. Div. 1049, 135 N.Y.S.2d 717 (2d Dep't 1954).
22. Instant case at 155.
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decision by clarifying that the continuous treatment which is referred to is
"treatment for the same or related illness or injuries, continuing after the
alleged acts of malpractice, not mere continuity of a general physician-patient
'23
relationship.
In arriving at its conclusion the court cited prior decisions from New York
and elsewhere which were decisively in favor of the application of the continuous treatment doctrine.24 The result reached here was based on an earlier
New York decision in which the court referred to "a continuing course of ...
treatment" which would keep the statute from accruing. 25 Therefore, when the
court approved the continuous treatment formula the majority was not making
a rash or sudden break with precedent. In fact, it was pointed out that such
has been the uniform trend in New York except for two decisions. One of these
exceptions was the lower court decision of the present case. 26 The other has since
been reversed 2 7 The court was satisfied with following the majority view since
the conclusion reached by applying this reasoning was the more equitable. The
decision stated that "it would be absurd to require a wronged patient to interrupt
corrective efforts by serving a summons on the physician or hospital superintendent, or by filing a notice of claim in the case of a city hospital." By
applying this rule, the infant plaintiff would have been barred from instituting
a cause of action while still at the hospital receiving treatment if he had
remained there a few days longer. Thus the court was making a practical decision, but it did not remain unaware of the results possible from its holding.
Therefore, the majority flatly stated that they were not creating a justification
for suits brought years later merely because a patient continues to consult the
same physician for any kind of illness. The continuous treatment which would
prevent the statute from running was limited to "treatment for the same or
related illnesses or injuries, continuing after the alleged acts of malpractice, not
mere continuity of a general physician-patient relationship." The dissent also
recognized that strict application of the statute could lead to unjust results.
But, in its opinion, this was not a proper case to apply the continuous treatment theory as propounded by the majority because there was no plausible
reason for concluding the injury was the result of a continuous course of
treatment. Furthermore, the dissent said that by giving this plaintiff the relief
he demands the majority is disrupting "established distinctions between cases
involving a continuous course of improper treatment and those presenting merely
an isolated act or acts."
The holding here appears to be in the interest of promulgating a policy
of fairness and alleviating harsh results in cases of malpractice. New York
23. Id. at 157, 187 N.E.2d at 779, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 322.
24. Cases cited supra notes 11, 13 & 14.
25. Hammer v. Rosen, 7 N.Y.2d 376, 380, 165 N.E.2d 756, 757, 198 N.Y.S.2d 65,
67 (1960).
26. Borgia v. City of N.Y., 16 A.D.2d 927, 229 N.Y.S.2d 318 (2d Dep't 1962).
27. Gross v. Wise, 16 A.D.2d 682, 227 N.Y.S.2d 523 (2d Dep't 1962), rev'd, 18
A.D.2d 1097, 239 N.Y.S.2d 954 (2d Dep't 1963).
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courts have long been cognizant of the injustices possible by strict adherence
to its rigid statute of limitations. Even in its earliest application, the continuous treatment doctrine was inherently a circumvention of the rigid statute.
However, here the dissent could not understand how the court could grant this
plaintiff's relief without overturning the distinction between cases involving
a continuous course of improper treatment and those presenting merely an
isolated improper act or acts. It is submitted that such a distinction has not
been made in recent decisions. Therefore, if the majority is disregarding such
a distinction it was disregarded prior to the instant case. In one recent decision
the court made no mention that treatment subsequent to the wrongful act need
itself be negligent. 28 In addition, the trial court in the present case held that the
statute of limitations in malpractice cases accrues when the course of treatment ends without regard to whether there have been negligent acts throughout
the course of treatment. 29 Also, within the instant case, one recent decision
was cited as contrary to this holding which has since been reversed. 80 In reversing the decision it was held that a cause for malpractice is not barred by the
statute where the defendant rendered treatment to the plaintiff with respect to
the particular condition complained of, even though there was no claim that
treatment subsequent to the malpractice was improper in any way. This is
significant in that by citing the instant case, it indicates immediate acceptance
of that holding. Although the extent of circumventing the statute has been
somewhat limited by requiring the treatment to be for the "same or related
illness," there is now a new area for disagreement in applying the continuous
doctrine to the statute. In the future, courts will be confronted with problems
of defining related treatment. This can be forecast by the minority which based
its dissent on the theory that "the infant's subsequent stay for the purpose of
physiotherapy and rehabilitation can in no sense be deemed continuous treatment for burns, or a continuation of the original wrong." But what could be
more related to an irrepairable brain injury, leaving the injured party near total
incapacitation, than such treatment? Since no known medication or surgery
could recover the use of the infant's mental capacities prior to the injury, the
only treatment available to him for the wrong committed was that which was
afforded him. The dissent by concluding otherwise on this point, illustrates this
new problem in applying .the continuous treatment doctrine. Therefore, the
decision does not eliminate all areas of doubt in this field. It is submitted,
as it has been done previously, that an amendment to the statute of limitations
as to malpractice is the only solution to the problem.
As long as . . .continues to remain on the books in its present form,
our courts will be saddled with an unnecessarily ambiguous statute.
28. Hammer v. Rosen, 7 N.Y.2d 376, 165 N.E.2d 756, 198 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1960).
29. Borgia v. City of N.Y., 216 N.Y.S.2d 897, 903 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
30. Gross v. Wise, 16 A.D.2d 682, 227 N.Y.S.2d 523 (2d Dep't 1962), rev'd, 18
A.D.2d 1097, 239 N.Y.S.2d 954 (2d Dep't 1963).
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no room for doubt
An amended statute, explicit in terms and leaving
31
on any point, would prevent further injustice.
Ronald B. Felman
CONSTRUCTIVE RELEASE OF Co-ToRTFEASORS FALLS

Following the granting of a general release in an auto negligence claim,
the plaintiff sustained aggravation of her injuries through maltreatment. In an
action to recover against the alleged malpractitioner, the bar of a general release
granted a fellow tortfeasor was raised. Upon appeal the Court of Appeals held,
where a general release is granted to one who has not acted jointly, in concert,
with his co-tortfeasors, the release will not by operation of law discharge the liabilities of such co-tortfeasors. Instead, availability of the release in their defense
presents questions of fact concerning the adequacy of the compensation had
by the grantor or the intention of the grantor to surrender all claims for less
than full compensation. Both issues are to be borne by the plaintiff. Derby v.
Prewitt, 12 N.Y.2d 100, 187 N.E.2d 556, 236 N.Y.S.2d 953 (1962) (three
judges dissenting).
English common law courts fashioned the rule of constructive release based
upon the concept of joint tort liability. Concerted action served the common
law courts as a link by which the individual joint tortfeasor could be held
vicariously liable for the entire damage produced by such conduct.1 This
liability was neither predicated upon causation in fact,2 nor upon 'foreseeability
of the damage that flowed from the act.3 The gist of the concept was the mutual
agency by which the act of one became the act of all.4 Since any one joint
tortfeasor was liable for the total damage by imputation of the fault of all, his
release was the release of all.r Of course this conclusion assumes that full compensation has been had for the release. At common law there was some excuse
for such an assumption. Releases were then sealed instruments, recitals in which
were conclusive. 6 Confusion over the meaning of a joint tortfeasor, the terms
as used in various contexts, led to the extension of the rule of release by operation of law to mere co-tortfeasors. 7 The corresponding rule in the law of
judgments did not share this development. Unsatisfied judgments against one
co-tortfeasor did not bar recovery against other co-tortfeasors. 8 Harsh rules
permit of harsh exceptions, so that the courts in order to mitigate the rigorous
result began by construction to view releases containing a reservation of claims
31.

16 St. John's L. Rev. 108 (1941).

1. Duck v. Mayeu, [18921 2 Q.B. 511; Prosser, Torts 234 (2d ed. 1955).
2. Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 Cal. L. Rev. 413 (1932).
3. Thompson v. Johnson, 180 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1950).
4. Prosser, Torts 225, 234 (2d ed. 1955).
5. Southern Pacific Co. v. Raish, 205 F.2d 389 (9th Cir. 1953); Ludo v. Curran,
2 N.Y.2d 157, 139 N.E.2d 133, 157 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1956).
6. Williston, Contracts 3140 (1920).
7. Prosser, Torts 233, 242-43 (2d ed. 1955).
8. Id. at 241, 243.

